

Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg  
Institute for Advanced Study

# Workshop FOR2104

Delmenhorst, 10.-12. Februar 2016

## Organisatoren

Prof. Dr. Stefan Traub

Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg

Dr. Fabian Paetzel

Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg

## Veranstaltungsort:

Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg  
Institute for Advanced Study

Lehmkuhlenbusch 4  
27753 Delmenhorst  
[www.h-w-k.de](http://www.h-w-k.de)

Stand 08.02.2016

Programm

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- Die *Wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter* planen bitte *alle 3 Tage* für die Teilnahme ein.
  - Die *Teilprojektleiter*, die keine Schulung geben, planen bitte den *11. und 12. Februar* für die Teilnahme ein.

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### **Mi, 10.2.2016 (wiss. Mitarbeiter und Dozenten)**

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**12:00 Uhr: Mittagessen am HWK**

13:30 Uhr: Workshop Psychologie (Adele Diederich)

**15:00 Uhr: Kaffeepause**

15:30 Uhr: Workshop Psychologie (Adele Diederich)

**18:00 Uhr: Abendessen am HWK**

19:30 Uhr: Dinner Vortrag (Arne Weiß)

Von guten und schlechten Experimentalpapieren - eigene gute und schlechte Erfahrungen als Anregung zur Diskussion

### **Do, 11.2.2016 (vormittags: Wiss. Mitarbeiter und Dozenten; nachmittags: alle Mitglieder der FOR)**

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9:00 Uhr: Ökonometrie-Kurs (Andreas Nicklisch)

**10:30 Uhr: Kaffeepause**

10:45 Uhr: Ökonometrie-Kurs (Andreas Nicklisch)

**12:30 Uhr: Mittagessen am HWK**

14:00 Uhr: Teilprojekt C1: Nach dem Pretest ist vor dem Experiment -  
Diskussion des experimentellen Designs

15:00 Uhr: Bernhard Kittel, Sabine Neuhofer und Manuel  
Schwaninger: Needs-Based justice in social exchange networks:  
Preliminary results

### **16:00 Uhr Kaffeepause**

16:30 Uhr: Teilprojekt D1: It's a Long Way to Tipperary - the experimental design of needs-based redistribution experiments

17:30 Uhr: Jan Lorenz, Maximilian Lutz, Fabian Paetzel und Markus Tepe: Voting on Redistribution through a "Leaky Bucket". Evidence from a Laboratory Democracy

### **19:30 Uhr: Abendessen im Restaurant Gaswerk**

**Fr., 12.2.2016 (vormittags: alle Mitglieder der FOR; nachmittags: Teilprojektleiter)**

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9:00 Uhr: Mark Siebel, Teilprojekt A2: Werkstattbericht: Entwicklung eines empirisch gestützten Maßes der Bedarfsgerechtigkeit - ein axiomatischer Ansatz

### **10:00 Uhr: Kaffeepause**

10:30-11:30 Uhr: Gastvortrag von Prof. Dr. Stefan Liebig  
How do individuals know about the wage they deserve? Earnings-mobility, inequality within the firm and the just wage

11:30-12:30 Uhr: Gastvortrag von Prof. Dr. Claudia Landwehr  
Präferenzen über Entscheidungsverfahren: Wer will demokratische Innovationen, und warum?

### **12:30 Uhr: Mittagessen am HWK**

13:30 Uhr: Besprechung der Teilprojektleiter

Siehe beiliegende Agenda für das Treffen.

### **15:00 Uhr Kaffeepause**

Gegen 17.30 Uhr: Ende

## Sammlung einiger Abstracts:

Claudia Landwehr:

Präferenzen über Entscheidungsverfahren: Wer will demokratische Innovationen, und warum?

Entscheidungsverfahren, die als „fair“ und „demokratisch“ wahrgenommen werden, ermöglichen einen prozeduralen Konsens, der den Umgang mit substantiellen Konflikten, und insbesondere mit Verteilungskonflikten, auch dann ermöglicht, wenn diese auf der substantiellen Ebene unauflösbar bleiben. Wenn aktuell von Defiziten und Krisen der Demokratie die Rede ist, dann wird gerade dieser prozedurale Konsens in Frage gestellt. Vorschläge „demokratischer Innovationen“ zielen darauf ab, die Legitimationswirkung von Verfahren zu stärken und somit den prozeduralen Konsens (wieder-) herzustellen und zu bestätigen. Dabei muss jedoch berücksichtigt werden, dass jedes Entscheidungsverfahren, und somit auch jede Veränderung eines Entscheidungsverfahrens, Auswirkungen auf Entscheidungsprozesse und Ergebnisse, und somit Verteilungsimplicationen hat. Deshalb ist auch bei prozeduralen Entscheidungen, etwa über demokratische Innovationen, mit divergierenden Präferenzen und Konflikten zu rechnen. Ich diskutiere verschiedene Vorschläge für demokratische Innovationen (Wahlrechtsreform, deliberative Verfahren, direktdemokratische Verfahren, expertokratische Verfahren) in Hinblick auf ihre möglichen Verteilungsimplicationen. Darüber hinaus stelle ich erste Ergebnisse aus einem Projekt vor, das Determinanten von Präferenzen über demokratische Entscheidungsverfahren untersucht und dabei insbesondere der Frage nachgeht, inwieweit diese von normativen Demokratiekonzeptionen oder Verteilungsinteressen und -präferenzen abhängen.

Stefan Liebig (Bielefeld University)

Meir Yaish (University of Haifa)

How do individuals know about the wage they deserve?

Earnings-mobility, inequality within the firm and the just wage

Within labor economics wage expectations play a crucial role. But how do individuals know what wage they can expect? The standard answer is: by social comparisons. But this is only one source from where expectations arise. In this paper we argue that two central dimension of human life are also important: time and space. Time matters, as experienced earnings mobility in the past constitutes specific reward expectations and space do also matter, as it is important which rewards are feasible within a certain social context. Based on recent theoretical models from inequality research we assume that for the latter the degree of inequality within a firm defines the frame within individuals develop reward expectations. Based on a probability sample of 1537 German employees in the age of 25 to 60 years we analyze the determinants of reward expectations. We link the personal data from a survey with records of the German Employment Agency on the job history of each respondent and the degree of inequality within the firms the respondents have been employed over the last 10 years. Our results from applying structural equation models show that both, mobility experiences and the degree of earnings inequality on the firm level play a crucial role for an individual's conception of the own just wage and his or hers evaluation of the actual income.

Bernhard Kittel, Sabine Neuhofer & Manuel Schwaninger:

### Needs-Based justice in social exchange networks: Preliminary results

A need that is recognized as such might induce people to allocate more to society members that need more resources, leading to a needs-based distribution. Building on the literature on social exchange, we designed an experiment using two simple 3-node network structures. In both networks actors are negatively connected and bilaterally negotiate over a given distribution of resources. In these networks we operationalize individual needs as a threshold of points a participant has to receive in order to earn additional points in a subsequent real effort task. The varying thresholds are randomly allocated to the actors and publicly known. In particular, we test how and when needs are recognized and whether the distributive principle of needs-based justice is relevant in social exchange in networks. In a first analysis we focus on the network structure and the collocation of needs as well as the comparison of a theoretical versus a practical acknowledgement of individual needs.

### Teilprojekt D1:

#### It's a Long Way to Tipperary - the experimental design of needs-based redistribution experiments

The majority of redistribution systems follows some kind of need-based rationing. That is, there is a socio-economic minimum income which is guaranteed by subsidies. Redistribution is financed by mandatory charges on income (tax). In this article, we want to quantify the potential costs of need-based rationing in comparison to a non-mandatory redistribution. We analyse important facets of need-based redistribution which are likely to influence its costs. For this purpose, we consider an experiment where participants have to perform a real effort task yielding labor income. We compare voluntary and mandatory charges (i.e., donations versus taxes) for participants who either need them to qualify for the second working phase or just receive the money (i.e., redistribution is motivated by the very specific needs or without any specific purpose). Among those participants who receive charges, some are systematically disadvantaged such that they solve more difficult math tasks (adding two five-digit numbers) than their peers (adding two three-digit numbers), while others do not participate in the first working phase at all. In this presentation, we will present the design of our experiment and the expected results

Jan Lorenz, Maximilian Lutz, Fabian Paetzel and Markus Tepe

Voting on Redistribution through a "Leaky Bucket". Evidence from a Laboratory Democracy

The Meltzer-Richard model is generally considered as the working horse model in the political economy of redistribution. Its prediction that non-egalitarian societies redistribute more, however, receives little empirical support from macro comparative research. This study argues that the inefficiency ("leaky bucket") of the redistribution regime itself helps to explain why empirical levels of redistribution are lower than predicted levels. Utilizing a modified version of the Meltzer-Richard Model we designed a laboratory experiment to test how inefficiency of the redistribution regime affects the individual vote and collective decisions on redistribution. Subjects were matched into anonymous groups of five individuals with a given individual gross income. Each group votes on a proportional tax rate under majority rule. The collective agreed tax rate is implemented and determines the individual pay-off. The treatment variable is the degree of inefficiency attached to the redistribution system (e.g. 10% inefficiency means that 10% of the tax revenues get lost in the system). This experimental design enables us to test how inefficiency ("leaky bucket") affects the individually and collectively preferred tax rate. Experimental findings can be summarized in two points: First, contrary to the formal solution, inefficiency significantly lowers the individually preferred and collectively agreed tax rate. Second, there is no linear relationship between the size of the leak and the reduction in redistribution, implying that a little bit of inefficiency can lead to a lot of less redistribution. These findings are robust after controlling for subjects' political ideology and welfare state preferences.